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Abstract
Backgound:  Sulphadoxine/sulphalene-pyrimethamine (SP) was adopted in Kenya as first line therapeutic for
uncomplicated malaria in 1998. By the second half of 2003, there was convincing evidence that SP was failing and had to
be replaced. Despite several descriptive investigations of policy change and implementation when countries moved from
chloroquine to SP, the different constraints of moving to artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) in Africa are less
well documented.
Methods: A narrative description of the process of anti-malarial drug policy change, financing and implementation in
Kenya is assembled from discussions with stakeholders, reports, newspaper articles, minutes of meetings and email
correspondence between actors in the policy change process. The narrative has been structured to capture the timing of
events, the difficulties and hurdles faced and the resolutions reached to the final implementation of a new treatment policy.
Results: Following a recognition that SP was failing there was a rapid technical appraisal of available data and replacement
options resulting in a decision to adopt artemether-lumefantrine (AL) as the recommended first-line therapy in Kenya,
announced in April 2004. Funding requirements were approved by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM) and over 60 million US$ were agreed in principle in July 2004 to procure AL and implement the policy change.
AL arrived in Kenya in May 2006, distribution to health facilities began in July 2006 coincidental with cascade in-service
training in the revised national guidelines. Both training and drug distribution were almost complete by the end of 2006.
The article examines why it took over 32 months from announcing a drug policy change to completing early
implementation. Reasons included: lack of clarity on sustainable financing of an expensive therapeutic for a common
disease, a delay in release of funding, a lack of comparative efficacy data between AL and amodiaquine-based alternatives,
a poor dialogue with pharmaceutical companies with a national interest in antimalarial drug supply versus the single
sourcing of AL and complex drug ordering, tendering and procurement procedures.
Conclusion: Decisions to abandon failing monotherapy in favour of ACT for the treatment of malaria can be achieved
relatively quickly. Future policy changes in Africa should be carefully prepared for a myriad of financial, political and
legislative issues that might limit the rapid translation of drug policy change into action.
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Background
In recent years the threat posed by failing, but inexpen-
sive, antimalarial monotherapies led to an international
effort to replace these drugs with relatively more expen-
sive but considerably more effective artemisinin-based
combination therapies (ACTs) for the management of
uncomplicated malaria [1-3]. However, a change in inter-
national therapeutic recommendations does not always
translate to an immediate, effective policy change at coun-
try levels.
Several authors have commented on the difficulties facing
national antimalarial drug policy change when these
changes involved moving from one inexpensive failing
drug, such as chloroquine (CQ) to an equally widely
available, inexpensive but more efficacious monotherapy
such as sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine [4-8]. These obser-
vations during the 1990's and early 2000's highlighted the
complexity of drug policy change and implementation for
malaria case-management in Africa.
Since the inception of Roll-Back-Malaria (RBM) and the
renaissance in malaria control and prevention in Kenya,
the Ministry of Health (MoH) has had to change its first-
line recommendations for the treatment of uncompli-
cated malaria twice. The first change occurred in 1998
when sulphadoxine/sulphalene-pyrimethamine (SP)
replaced CQ. The processes leading to policy change and
implementation have been described previously [4]. In
2004 the policy was changed again from SP to an ACT.
This paper reviews the evidence used to effect this policy
change and the political and economic challenges facing
the Kenyan MoH prior to and during the implementation
of the policy 32 months after the policy change was
announced.
Methods
All published and unpublished documentary evidence
surrounding the antimalarial drug policy change over the
period 2001 to 2006 were reviewed, including narrative
reports from stakeholders involved in the drug policy
change and implementation (obtained through the
authors' informal networks), MoH reports, minutes of
meetings, and email correspondence between actors in
the policy change process. In addition, all articles related
to malaria and the antimalarial drug policy were prospec-
tively compiled from the two leading newspapers in
Kenya (the Daily Nation and The Standard) for the same
period. These data were supplemented by the authors'
observations of the policy change process (several of the
authors were actively involved and attended many of the
relevant meetings). Data have been structured to capture
the timing of events, the difficulties and hurdles faced and
the resolutions reached to the final implementation of a
new treatment policy. Several drafts of the final narrative
were shared with stakeholders who clarified and corrected
specific issues.
Results
Establishing the evidence and basis for drug policy change
Following the official transition from CQ to SP in 1998
the MoH's Division of Malaria Control (DOMC) and
research partners maintained a series of surveillance stud-
ies on the sensitivity of SP and amodiaquine (AQ) [9,10],
the recommended first and second-line treatments for
uncomplicated malaria respectively. By 2001, the year the
National Malaria Strategy was officially launched, con-
cerns were raised about growing evidence of a decline in
SP clinical efficacy as measured through the then standard
WHO day 14 clinical and parasitological sensitivity test.
By mid-June 2001, 6/15 (40%) studies undertaken by the
DOMC and 3/6 (50%) by other partners showed that SP
clinical and parasitological failure rates by day 14 were in
excess of 25% (the WHO suggested change rubric of 25%
failure rate is commonly used in the sub-region to inform
antimalarial drug policy changes) [10-13]. Conversely,
there appeared to be better day 14 cure rates (≥ 75%)
across studies where AQ was tested (19/20 studies)
[10,13]. In June 2001 a meeting was convened by the
DOMC and its partners to discuss strategies principally
around how better to deliver medicines through the retail
sector. However, the meeting also raised the urgent need
to assemble the evidence on SP failure rates noting that
"...plans for the introduction of a replacement [were] now
urgent..." [14]. A second meeting was held just four
months later to "...review the national antimalarial drug pol-
icy and build a national consensus on malaria treatment..."
[15]; however, it wasn't until the final quarter of 2003,
that the status of SP was deemed desperate requiring the
formation of a national task force [16-18]; at this time,
seven out of nine studies (more than 75%) conducted
between 2002 and 2003, including those examining
patients through to day 28, showed SP failure rates in
excess of 25% [10,19]. Whilst it was accepted that a
change to a new first line therapy was urgently required,
the possibilities for replacements were limited.
The decline in the clinical efficacy of SP in Kenya was hap-
pening within the context of an international push
towards ACT in countries where monotherapies were fail-
ing [1,2,21] at a time when attention was focused on
increasing international funding for effective malaria ther-
apies [21]. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (GFATM) was launched in January 2002 as a
financing mechanism for commodities and delivery of
effective control of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. In January
2004, the publication of claims of "medical malpractice"
by the GFATM for financing countries requesting drugs
that weren't clinically efficacious heightened the debate
on rapid deployment of ACT across Africa [2]. Kenya wasMalaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
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included in this criticism as they requested in September
2002 approximately two million US dollars (US$) worth
of SP in their successful Round-2 GFATM bid [22].
The first Kenyan Drug Policy Technical Working Group
(DPTWG) meeting was convened on 6th November 2003
[16]. The working group comprised the MoH, non-gov-
ernmental organization (NGO) partners, bilateral donors,
representatives of the research community and technical
support from the World Health Organization (WHO).
Data on SP and AQ sensitivity were reviewed and possible
first-line replacements considered. Options considered
were: moving AQ from second-line treatment to first-line
therapy; combining SP with artesunate; using the recently
registered chlorproguanil-dapsone (LAPDAP®) product;
combining AQ with artesunate (AQ-AS); or using arte-
mether-lumefantrine (AL). However, unlike the previous
antimalarial drug policy change in 1998, there was a lack
of any nationally generated, comparable sensitivity data,
with the exception of AQ monotherapy, on the suggested
alternatives. This posed a problem for informed choices
by the DPTWG. The DPTWG felt that given the current
pressure to avoid monotherapy and the short-term gains
in combining SP with another partner drug eliminated
these choices. Further, the WHO was unhappy about wide
scale use of LAPDAP® without further safety data [23].
Thus, the choices were between AQ-AS versus AL. The
need to assemble more information on AQ sensitivity and
undertake carefully conducted open label, day 28 sensitiv-
ity studies of AQ-AS and AL were recommended to fill the
information void.
There was only one clinical efficacy study undertaken in
Kenya on AL available for review pre-publication in Janu-
ary 2004. This study was undertaken at Kilifi, on the Ken-
yan coast, as part of multi-country Phase III regulatory
approval studies for the 6-dose AL recommendation [24].
The interim results showed that over 95% of children
attained adequate clinical and parasitological response by
day 28 for both the supervised and unsupervised groups.
The data generated from this study were presented to the
DOMC during the 3rd DPTWG who felt that one study was
insufficient and insisted on a multi-site comparison of AL
with AQ-AS. Deliberations on who would undertake these
studies and how they would be funded continued through
the 4th and 5th DPTWG meetings between January and
March 2004 [13,19]. These studies were never completed.
WHO provided technical support to the DOMC and pro-
vided examples of other countries, such as Zanzibar and
Zambia, who changed policy using only international and
regional evidence without comparative national data
[23]. The WHO also encouraged the DPTWG to consider
the operational complexities of carrying out drug policy
change and that issues of implementation should be
defined early. In January 2004 the DOMC formed sub-
groups of the DPTWG to address specific drug and non-
drug issues related to the drug policy change, including
therapeutic efficacy testing; legal issues; guidelines and
formulations; logistics, procurement and supplies; case
management; and later Information, Education and Com-
munication (IEC) [13].
Debate continued over the quality and amount of evi-
dence available on the efficacy of AQ. Most of the day 28
studies undertaken by the DOMC under the auspices of
the East African Network for Monitoring Antimalarial
Treatment (EANMAT) were not corrected for possible new
infections and that these data were at variance with data
generated by the Africa Medical Research Foundation
(AMREF) at other sites that showed high failure rates for
AQ monotherapy [13]. These discrepancies were never
fully resolved and a view persisted that AQ was a valuable
long-term combination partner by some members of the
DPTWG despite evidence of AQ failure from neighboring
countries [10].
On the 3rd March 2004 an urgent meeting of the DPTWG
was convened in anticipation of the deadlines for the
Round 4 GFATM application on the 5th of April 2004 [19].
It was clear that a decision had to be made on what ACT
was to be announced as the replacement therapy for SP,
an estimation of drug needs and costs was required and a
strategy for delivery articulated and costed. A decision
based on international, regional, sub-regional and coun-
try efficacy data and country experiences was taken at this
DPTWG meeting in favour of AL, with oral quinine rec-
ommended as the second-line treatment. The decision
was based largely on issues related to AL being the only
co-formulated ACT at the time, doubts that AQ could be
withdrawn from the informal sector as a monotherapy
while deploying AQ-AS in the formal sector and the
assumed rising levels of existing AQ resistance across
Kenya. Concerns were, however, raised about the high
cost of AL despite subsidized arrangements between
WHO and Novartis Pharma AG [3], and the notion that
the global supply of artemisinin was in jeopardy [19].
Both issues affected both AQ-AS and AL. It is notable that
at the time of the final decision to adopt AL there were no
comparative efficacy data on AL versus AQ-AS nor any
substantiated DOMC generated data on day 28 AQ sensi-
tivity.
On the 5th April 2004 the "National Symposium on Next
Anti-Malaria Treatment Policy in Kenya" was held at
Naivasha. The DPTWG sub-committees and other key par-
ticipants summarized their deliberations before the Min-
ister for Health informed the gathering that, after
negotiations with relevant bodies and development part-
ners, Kenya had opted to change policy to the WHO rec-
ommended ACT and AL was now the recommended first-Malaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
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line treatment for uncomplicated malaria [25]. The new
policy was reiterated on the 25th April 2004, Africa Malaria
Day, in a speech delivered by the Deputy Director of Med-
ical Services [26]. From this point began the long process
of policy implementation.
The GFATM Round-4 malaria proposal was submitted on
the 5th April 2004 and approved by the GFATM Technical
Review Panel (TRP) in July 2004 amounting to over 188
million US$ over 5 years including key components of
implementation of the new drug policy and scaling up
insecticide treated net coverage. The funds were approved
to be disbursed in two phases, the first amounting to over
82 million US$, including approximately 40 million US$
to cover the costs of procuring approximately 11 million
treatment doses of AL annually; second, the balance of
funds to be accessed following successful implementation
of the first phase [27,28]. Kenya proposed to phase in the
new drug policy, beginning with a two year (2006–2007)
introduction of free distribution of AL through the public
formal sector (government, NGO and mission health
facilities), followed by its use within the private formal
sector from 2008 and finally scaling-up to facilitate distri-
bution through the private for-profit retail sector from
2009. The initial three year restriction to the formal sector
was proposed as a way to build national confidence in the
new drug and to establish a better pharmacovigilance pro-
file before deregulating use for over-the-counter (OTC) in
2009. During this period, it was proposed that AQ be pro-
moted as an alternative to AL in the retail sector [29].
In summary, the decision to replace SP with AL as the
nationally recommended therapy for uncomplicated
malaria was a pragmatic choice. It was based on limited
comparative scientific data (between AL and competing
alternatives such as AQ-AS); legitimate international pres-
sure to abandon as soon as possible drugs that were no
longer efficacious; and the opportunity to fund more
expensive medicines through an international financing
mechanism. The GFATM announced on the 1st July 2004
that Kenya had been successful in its application for US$
82 million for phase 1 of Round-4. However, the practi-
calities of a rapid translation of policy into practice were
only fully appreciated after the policy was announced.
Delays in translating policy into practice
Despite several consultative meetings of the DPTWG and
other WHO advisory meetings, an announcement by the
Minister for Health and a successful application to the
GFATM, there remained several concerns about the imple-
mentation of the recommendation to adopt AL as first
line therapy. These revolved around long-term predictable
financing, procurement and supply, ensuring adequate
access across all service providers, the concerns of phar-
maceutical manufacturers, and regulatory issues with
regard to widening access to AL.
Financing, procurement and supply challenges
Concerns were raised regarding the long-term financial
sustainability of the new policy, especially in light of the
recent MoH's experience with the Haemophilus influenzae
type B (Hib) vaccine. Hib was introduced in the country
in 2001 [30] with an initial funding commitment from
the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. It
was initially agreed that at the end of the five-year funding
cycle in 2006, the MoH would incorporate Hib in the
Expanded Programme for Immunization. The agreement
was based on optimistic estimates that the cost of the vac-
cine would come down substantially [30,31]. However,
this did not happen and the MoH found itself saddled
with an expensive intervention for which it did not have
money. In light of this, the MoH viewed AL as an expen-
sive first-line antimalarial drug replacement, costing at
least ten times more than SP at the proposed subsidized
prices, which could not be financed directly and solely by
the MoH. In the absence of external funding, the cost of
AL alone would absorb the entire MoH budget for rural
drug supply [32-35].
In June 2004, the Director of Medical Services (DMS)
requested an economic evaluation of not changing policy.
In September 2004, the DMS called for an urgent meeting
to discuss the AL drug policy decision where it was
resolved that an official assurance should be sought from
the GFATM that the new policy would not be jeopardized
over the next five years because of a failure after two years
to meet all the milestones set for implementation of non-
drug policy related funding requests [32]. A few weeks
later, on 30th September 2004, a meeting was called by the
GFATM to offer countries technical assistance on re-pro-
gramming committed funds from Round-2 funding for
monotherapies. The Kenyan DMS asked for an unequivo-
cal assurance on continued funding, however the GFATM
maintained that it was unable to provide this assurance
given the vagaries of its own donors [36].
The economic analysis became an ever increasing concern
for the MoH and was discussed at length during subse-
quent meetings of the DPTWG during the delay in signing
the GFATM Round 4 agreement [37,38]. Some bilateral
donors such as the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) tried to allay the fears of financial
sustainability by pledging funds to kick-start the purchase
of AL on one hand and trying to lobby long term financial
support for the policy from other partners on the other.
The economic analysis was never undertaken and deci-
sions to continue with AL were taken without this analy-
sis.Malaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
Page 5 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Another challenge facing the DOMC and MoH was navi-
gating the complex financial and procurement arrange-
ments for AL [39-42]. The main challenge centered on
how to manage the financial flows to make sure funds
were availed in time for orders to be placed and processed.
Theoretically, funds would flow from the GFATM, to the
principal recipient (Ministry of Finance), then to the MoH
(sub-recipient). The MoH would, after consultation with
the national procurement consortium established to man-
age the tendering and ordering of commodities purchased
with GFATM funds, place an order with WHO to forward
the order to the supplier (Novartis Pharma AG in Switzer-
land). As per GFATM rules a Local Fund Agent (LFA),
KPMG Kenya, should verify disbursement requests and
financial reports on behalf of the GFATM. Quarterly
release of monies already approved under Rounds-2 and
4 for malaria were contingent on the LFA signing off on
how well the funds disbursed during the previous quarter
were used; this, in turn, was used as a proxy for meeting
performance targets. Although the GFATM TRP approved
the Round-4 proposal in July 2004, concerns were raised
by the GFATM about meeting broad performance targets,
local fund management and procurement related to funds
allocated for HIV/AIDs, TB and malaria during Round-2.
This delayed considerably the final signing of the Round
4 agreement which happened 9 months after the TRP
approval [43].
Reconciling the complexity of the ordering and procure-
ment procedures delayed the final submission of the AL
request to WHO. The request was finally made in June
2005 and approved by WHO within two days. In addi-
tion, the delays in flow of Global Funds continued to
postpone the timing of programmatic activities such as
health worker training on the new drug, planned around
the drug's arrival in the country. To circumvent the com-
plex process of paying for the drugs once the order had
been placed, a decision was made by the MoH to have the
GFATM directly pay Novartis Pharma AG for AL orders but
required the approval of the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
The MoH wrote to the MoF in September 2005 and
approval for this arrangement was obtained in December
2005, six months after an order had been initially placed
with the WHO. Following the signed GFATM Round-4
agreement and a means to disburse the funds to WHO,
the original order was processed in February 2006 and the
first AL supplies arrived in Kenya three months later. The
process was reduced in subsequent orders to only three
months from placing an order receipt, financial disburse-
ment, to arrival of supplies in country.
National and international pharmaceutical interests
On 8th April 2004, three days after the AL policy change
was first announced, a regional meeting on AQ-AS was
launched for approximately 13 francophone countries
(which were using the product) with Kenya as the host.
The publicity surrounding this meeting overshadowed
Kenya's own policy change announcement. This caused
confusion, especially in the media, as to what the new
first-line policy was. Between April 8th and 13th 2004,
media reports appeared to endorse AQ-AS as the first line
drug for malaria [44-46]. These reports were denied by the
then head of the DOMC [47], but confusion continued in
the media where reports in the print media supported the
use of competing artemisinin products, such as artesu-
nate-mefloquine [48] and even a two-day regimen of
dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine [49].
The special arrangements between WHO, Novartis
Pharma AG and GFATM posed a problem under the
notion of single sourcing of drugs, contrary to the public
sector procurement rules that insisted upon competitive
bidding for government contracts unless a case could be
made for an exception [50]. Even though WHO was the
broker for AL supply, the tender process, paradoxically
still had to be adhered to. This was highlighted in a claim
by the Pharmaceutical Society of Kenya (PSK) in the
national press accusing the WHO of a "monopoly"
[51,52]. Tender documents, therefore, had to be prepared
by the national GFATM procurement consortium in Janu-
ary 2005, with the final drafts sent to the Permanent Sec-
retary, MoH, by February 14th 2005 and placed in the local
newspapers (February 18th 2005) for the supply of malaria
drugs [53-55]. This insistence on adhering to the letter of
the law even when there was a clear national need for an
exception, further delayed the procurement of AL by the
MoH.
The PSK made several representations through letters and
position papers to the MoH, presentations to media
houses, and organizing workshops questioning the choice
of AL as first-line between August 2004 and April 2005
[35,56]. The DOMC explained its position in a rejoinder
to the PSK in September 2004 [32,57] stating the technical
reasoning behind the selection of AL. This did not change
the position of PSK and its members, who have main-
tained their strident opposition to the new policy to date.
There are large stocks of artemisinin monotherapies, SP
and AQ in the Kenyan market [58] and concerns among
local manufacturers and importers of pharmaceuticals of
losing a market share to a transnational company.
Regulatory issues regarding widening access to AL
AL remains a prescription-only-medicine (POM) in line
with all artemisinin monotherapies and other combina-
tions [34]. For it to be availed in the non-premium, pri-
vate retail sector, where a substantial number of Kenyans
seek treatment for malaria fevers [59], requires mecha-
nisms to deregulate its POM status. The policy implemen-
tation plan acknowledges the need to deregulate AL forMalaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
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OTC use and develop some evidence based operational
research to maximize the best use of this drug as an OTC
medicine [60]. However, theoretically the POM status
would only be changed following the assembly of ade-
quate Phase IV safety data. The Pharmacy and Poisons
Board (PPB) will launch a pharmacovigilance system that
will entail passive reporting of adverse reactions to all
medicines, including AL and other antimalarial drugs, in
the second quarter of 2007 (Mohamed A, personal com-
munication).
The POM status of AL also affected its effective deploy-
ment in the formal health sector. According to the Phar-
macy and Poisons Act, not all cadres of health workers can
prescribe or dispense POM drugs; only medical doctors,
dentists, clinical officers and graduate pharmacists (in
emergencies only) are allowed to prescribe. Graduate
pharmacists can dispense all prescription drugs, but phar-
maceutical technologists can only dispense Part II poisons
(the so-called pharmacy only drugs); Part I poisons can
only be dispensed under supervision of a graduate phar-
macist [61]. This obviously posed a problem for lower
cadre health workers, such as nurses, who manage the
majority of malaria prescriptions and dispensing in most
government and mission health facilities. The Act invests
many powers in the Minister of Health who can make
exceptions to the rules and subsidiary legislation for better
service delivery. Normally, the MoH would issue a legal
notice through the Kenya Gazette to cover such excep-
tions, but this has not happened to date.
National implementation of the revised drug policy
Recognizing the complexities of implementing a new drug
policy, based on experiences of moving from CQ to SP,
the DOMC configured several sub-committees from the
DPTWG as early as March 2004. Their mandates were to
revise existing guidelines and make recommendations on
the best strategies for implementing the new policy [19].
The process by which these recommendations from these
committees were made and their effects on implementa-
tion of the AL policy are discussed below.
Revising national treatment guidelines
The first task was to update the "National guidelines for
diagnosis, treatment and prevention of malaria for health
workers in Kenya", last revised in 1998 [62]. A series of
draft guidelines were developed following an initial draft
in August 2004. The guidelines were finalized in March
2006 [63]. This process took approximately 23 months to
complete following the official announcement of the new
AL policy in Kenya. Delays were frequently encountered at
each iteration of the revised guideline beginning with
uncertainties surrounding the policy recommendation
(described above) and was characterized with ambiguities
on how to word the policy with some arguing for a general
term such as "ACT" and not "AL". Consensus was finally
achieved and AL was explicitly stated as the first line treat-
ment for uncomplicated malaria. Additional delays were
encountered in reaching a consensus on how to eliminate
ambiguous messages on the interpretation of negative
diagnostic tests from the previous guidelines, the incorpo-
ration of information and interpretation of new rapid
diagnostic tests, the need to harmonize recommendations
for children below five years of age with fever algorithms
of the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness guide-
lines [64] and the development of new algorithms for out-
patient case-management for febrile patients above five
years of age. All these revisions required multiple consul-
tations with many stakeholders and different divisions
within the MoH. Finally, between March and July 2006,
8,500 copies of the revised guidelines were produced and
subsequently disseminated to health workers through the
district health management teams and during in-service
trainings.
In-service training on revised national treatment guidelines
The second task was to train health workers on the new
case management guidelines. Following completion of
the guidelines in March 2006, the DPTWG developed
facilitators and participants manuals for in-service train-
ing [65,66]. The training was organized in a cascade man-
ner with the first training of trainers (TOT) workshop held
for 32 participants in April 2006 in Nairobi [67]. A second
national TOT was held in May 2006, combined with a
national policy dissemination workshop. A total of 48
participants were trained, including provincial medical
officers, representatives from the Christian Health Associ-
ation of Kenya, the Kenya Episcopal Conference (repre-
senting missions facilities run by the Catholic Church),
staff of the Mission for Essential Drugs and Supplies
(MEDS), representatives from major private hospitals in
the country and those from professional bodies such as
PSK and the Kenya Medical Association [68]. Provincial
level training was undertaken in June 2006 with approxi-
mately 405 TOTs trained, mostly members of District
Health Management Teams and senior district hospital
staffs [69]. A series of district level trainings for health
workers were launched between August and October 2006
and included mostly prescribers at lower ends of the
health system: nurses and clinical officers, laboratory
technicians, public health officers and pharmacists. At all
levels of the training cascade, the training was organized
in the form of 3-day workshops following the same curric-
ulum for approximately 30–40 participants per training
session. The cascade in-service training cost approxi-
mately 1.47 million US$ and was planned to cover over
60% of front-line health workers countrywide within
three months to ensure training was completed before the
delivery of AL to rural health facilities. In practice, how-
ever, there were delays in the release of GFATM funds toMalaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
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support the district-level training which inevitably
resulted in some facilities in some parts of the country
receiving AL without in-service training in its use. How-
ever, support was received from WHO and DFID-UK to
bridge funding gaps for training and full roll out of the
district-level training activities was completed in all dis-
tricts by December 2006 covering approximately 9,000
government and mission employed health workers
including those responsible for treatment, pharmacy and
laboratory services. In addition, approximately 236 pri-
vate practitioners and health workers in some government
parastatals and the armed forces were made aware of the
new drug policy during workshops organized by the Man-
agement Sciences for Health between August and October
2006.
Logistics, procurement and supplies
An implementation plan for the new policy was estab-
lished by July 2005 with logistics and supply chain man-
agement as one of the crucial components [29]. The initial
June 2005 order followed a quantification exercise that
estimated that on average 10 million treatment courses of
AL would be required annually [28,29,70]. Orders were
initially to be split into two 5 million treatment courses to
be received six months apart, however, because of the
short shelf-life of AL (24 months), the delivery of AL was
staggered quarterly with the first delivery of 2.63 million
treatment courses received in-country on the 18th May
2006. The delivery for the next quarter was split into two
with the first shipment of 1.30 million treatment courses
arriving in the country in August 2006, and the second
shipment of 1.11 million treatment courses arrived in
November 2006. Because of a drop in the international
prices of AL announced by Novartis Pharma AG in Sep-
tember 2006 [71], the drug supply for the second half of
2006/07 changed from the anticipated 5 million to 7.5
million treatment courses. The first part of the consign-
ment (3.2 million treatment courses) arrived in January
2007 and the balance arrived in Kenya in March 2007
[72].
Drugs were received by the Kenya Medical Supplies
Agency (KEMSA), who had the responsibility to distribute
AL directly to facility levels and guarantee drug availability
immediately post-in-service training. KEMSA was allo-
cated approximately 70% of the AL supply for distribution
to government facilities and 30% were allocated to MEDS
for distribution to approximately 850 mission facilities.
Drug distribution from KEMSA began in July 2006. Under
the distribution schedule all facilities in North Eastern
and Coast province were expected to request supplies
based upon consumption each month (a "pull system").
All hospitals (provincial, district, sub-district) and some
health centres nationwide were similarly expected to
make monthly supply requests. Non-hospital facilities in
all other provinces were expected to be supplied using a
"push system" of standard drug kits every three months.
To support on-going quantification of drug needs sup-
plies are accompanied with a new stock and inventory
management system that should feed back to the DOMC
and KEMSA to re-adjust future orders and supplies of AL.
Community awareness campaigns
A key strategy for the success of the new policy was a clear
and well articulated IEC programme. In April 2006 the
"Advocacy and Public Awareness Campaign For Artemisi-
nin Combination Therapy (ACT) In Kenya" plan was
developed [73]. This plan recognized that the comparative
advantage for mobilizing wide-scale public support for
the new drug policy was with the private-for-profit mar-
keting sector. A tender was issued for IEC services to
implement the strategy, and awarded to a local advertising
company in June 2006 [74]. The approach was multi
media including print media advertisements (10 spots),
television (481 spots), national and regional vernacular
radio (3,064 spots) and community road shows predom-
inantly in Kiswahili. Approximately 100,000 posters and
500,000 brochures were distributed countrywide to edu-
cate the public on the burden of malaria and to reinforce
key messages on the appropriate first-line drug including
where and how to access AL free-of-charge [74]. The IEC
campaign was provided important legitimacy when it was
officially launched by the President in September 2006
under the slogan Komesha Malaria, Okoa Maisha (Stop
Malaria, Save a Life) [75]. The IEC campaign ran for over
three months, costing approximately 0.48 million US$
and planned to reach 60% of the primary target audience,
caregivers of children under five years of age.
A key IEC challenge is product branding. Currently the
print and electronic media carry the message that the first-
line antimalarial drug policy in Kenya is ACT, and AL is
the ACT recommended in Kenya, to be provided free of
charge at government and mission health facilities [75].
However, the product procured through the Novartis
Pharma AG-WHO arrangement is branded Coartem® and
that is what patients receive at public health facilities (Fig-
ure 1). The MoH have taken a legitimate position that they
cannot be seen to be promoting a single product brand;
however this difference in labeled IEC messages and prod-
ucts dispensed might lead to some confusion by the
patient population.
Discussion
It is acknowledged that in assembling the evidence a few
milestone dates and discussions between key actors may
have been missed. However, on balance, the narrative
identifies the complexity of the drug policy change deci-
sion and implementation. The description of Kenya's pol-
icy change raises a number of issues for the futureMalaria Journal 2007, 6:72 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/6/1/72
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implementation of any new ACT drug policy. First, the
strident opposition from the local pharmaceutical indus-
try through such professional bodies as the PSK was not
entirely without merit. One of the key strategies of ensur-
ing sustainable drug supply at national levels, and defined
in the Kenya National Drug Policy [76], is local manufac-
ture of pharmaceuticals. There was a feeling within local
pharma that they were not adequately engaged in the pol-
icy change process and that real debate actually begun
after the policy was announced in Naivasha by the Minis-
ter of Health. Legitimate questions such as what to do
with their huge stocks of SP and AQ and currently the
artemisinin monotherapies have not been adequately
addressed.
Second, unlike the long delay (seven years) in taking the
decision to abandon CQ following overwhelming local
research evidence [4], the decision to abandon SP was
swift, largely driven by a very vocal international malaria
research community (Figure 2). This community had con-
sistently argued for the rationale of ACT for malaria in
Africa [3,77-80] and identified cost as the major impedi-
ment to having effective medicines deployed on the con-
tinent [21]. They, therefore, lobbied for more and better
targeted international funds for priority diseases such as
HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria [2,81]. However, choosing a
replacement to SP in Kenya was based on less national evi-
dence than when a decision was made to replace CQ with
SP. This inevitably weakened the stakeholder's acceptance
of the choice made and levels and future impacts of AQ
resistance should have been better documented. It has
subsequently emerged that levels of AQ resistance by day
21 are as high as 20% in some parts of Kenya [82] and
similar credible data would have helped in defending the
pragmatic decision made to transition to AL in April 2004.
Third, following a protracted decision to adopt SP as first
line therapy in August 1998, the financing and implemen-
tation of the policy decision was much faster compared to
the decision in 2004 to adopt AL. It took over two and half
years from a technical decision being reached to support
the use of AL as a first-line therapeutic to its actual arrival
in country and deployment to health facilities with
trained health workers supported by revised national
treatment guidelines (Figure 2). The factors that resulted
in a paralysis from policy decision to policy implementa-
tion included (1) concerns and government procurement
difficulties with a single-sourced product; (2) timely
access to external funds provided by the GFATM; (3) lack
of agreement on whether there was a long-term, sustaina-
ble financing plan; and (4) competing local and interna-
tional interests for alternatives to AL. The GFATM was in
its nascent stages and experience needed to be built in
putting up structures that would ensure its monies were
spent in a transparent way. Nonetheless, alternative mech-
anisms of financing drug procurement require further
attention and the issue of long-term financing remains
unresolved.
Fourth, the legislative issues surrounding the use of new
medicines at different levels of the formal and informal
health sector are necessarily strict. However, flexibility is
required to ensure that those who see patients most regu-
larly within a formal health care setting can actually pre-
scribe common medicines. For AL to be used an an OTC
medicine in Kenya a functioning and effective pharma-
coviligance system is required to guide legislation around
this and other new ACT drug products. To a large extent
these are non-existent in most countries in Africa [83].
Unless quality information on adverse event profiles can
be built up around AL, this will present the Kenyan MoH
with a difficult decision to make AL available OTC in
2009.
Finally, countries who have had to change their national
antimalarial drug policy will recognize the complexities of
harmonizing various national treatment guidelines,
developing effective in-service training, ensuring adequate
drug supply and educating the patient population. These
activities consume huge amounts of ministry staff time
and demand inputs from many other partners. The
national treatment guidelines took over 23 months to
revise, the cascade training took nine months to complete
and while drug distribution from central stores to facilities
was relatively quick it remains to be seen how a revised
facility, pull-based ordering system will operate in the
future. These activities must be carefully managed to
avoid health workers being confronted with new drugs
Figure showing public promotion of the generic terms "ACT"  and "AL" (left panel) and labeled drug provided to patients  (right panel) Figure 1
Figure showing public promotion of the generic terms "ACT" 
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without information on how to prescribe and dispense
them, trained health workers without the resources to
implement the new policy or a patient population told
that old medicines don't work but who cannot access new
medicines. Despite a long delay in the implementation of
the new policy, at an immeasurable cost to patients
treated with failing drugs for two years, when orders were
finally financed the MoH was prepared for implementa-
tion. The effectiveness of implementation is currently
being evaluated as part of detailed studies of health
worker and health facility performance. This step is critical
because policy change and implementation does not nec-
essarily translate into adequate quality case-management
of patents at the point of care [84].
The early implementation of the revised malaria case-
management strategy has many hurdles ahead. How to
sustain regular drug supplies, manage new systems of
drug ordering from health facilities to manufacturer, cap-
italize on the availability of effective medicines to
improve the way patients are managed in the formal
health sector, build a credible evidence-based platform of
pharmacovigilance and use these data to inform the final
endpoints of the policy to deregulate the POM status of AL
for OTC use are all challenges yet to be tackled. These final
stages of the policy change will require careful manage-
ment by all stakeholders supported by credible opera-
tional research.
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